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Fifty years ago President Truman signed into law the
Employment Act that committed the U.S. government to the goal of
employment opportunities for all Americans. The Act represented a
pledge to avoid another Great Depression. It acknowledged that
government has a vital role to play in establishing national
economic stability and prosperity.
U.S. economic performance during the past fifty years can be
divided into two periods of roughly equal duration. The first was
characterized by a successful economy: cyclical instability was
controlled; resource creation was supported; and flaws in selected
markets were corrected. It was a period of robust economic growth,
rising worker incomes and falling inequality.
The second period has brought a reversal of fortune. We have
avoided another depression, but suffer from a return of financial
instability. Economic growth has been sustained but family
earnings are stagnant. Corporate profits have been stabilized but
economic insecurity has grown considerably and now pervades the
workforce.
Our current difficulties make it necessary to consider not
only how we measure the success of an economy but also the
institutional prerequisites for a successful 2lst-Century
capitalism. But first we must ask: what accounts for the split in
America's economic experience during the post-world War II era?2
Money-Manager Capitalism
Numerous explanations have been put forth to account for the
phenomena of falling worker incomes and rising instability and
inequality experienced during the past two decades. Increases in
government taxes, spending and regulation are not to blame. Income
and distribution problems can be traced to pre-tax earnings, not
tax changes. Government shares of total employment and expenditure
have not been growing since 1979, and regulatory costs have
declined (Mishel 1995).
Other recent explanations focus on one or more of the
following developments: the shift of jobs from goods-producing
sectors to the service sector; an acceleration of technological
change (especially in the realm of information technologies);
public-sector privatization and corporate downsizing and
outsourcing; increased immigration; the erosion of the minimum wage
and the decline of unions; the growth of contingent work; the
appearance of persistent trade deficits; and increased capital
mobility, trade liberalization, and global competition. While some
have sought to calculate the relative impact of these developments,
Barry Bluestone (1995) seems to emphasize the most essential aspect
of the matter when he suggests that the solution to this mystery is
the same is in Agatha Christie's Murder OR the Orient Express --
they all did it.
Despite the relevance of the aforementioned factors, one
crucial element has been left out -- the evolution of the financial
structure. Capitalism is a dynamic, evolving system that comes in3
many forms. Nowhere is this dynamism more evident than in its
financial structure. The financial structure of the American
economy has undergone significant evolution over the history of the
republic. From its initial stage of ltcommerciall' capitalism,
during which external finance was used mainly for trade, this
structure has evolved into its present stage of "money-manager"
capitalism, where financial markets and arrangements are dominated
by managers of funds.
Two financial stages, "industrialt' capitalism and
"paternalistic" capitalism, were dominant between the eras of
commercial and money-manager capitalism. The shift away from
commercial capitalism came as financing for trade purposes became
dwarfed by reliance on external funds to finance long-term capital
development. The economic contraction and eventual collapse in the
period 1929-1933  brought this second stage to an end and led to the
New Deal restructuring that ushered in the paternalistic era.
Important aspects of the financial system in the era of
paternalistic capitalism included: countercyclical fiscal policy,
which sustained profits when the economy faltered: low interest
rates and interventions by the Federal Reserve unconstrained by
gold-standard considerations; deposit insurance for banks and
thrifts; establishment of a temporary, national investment bank
(the Reconstruction Finance Corporation) to infuse government
equity into transportation, industry and finance; and interventions
by specialized organizations created to address sectoral concerns
(such as those in housing and agriculture).4
From 1933 through the end of World War II, government
represented the main source of external financing for the economy.
By 1946, a broad set of households owned financial assets mainly in
the form of government debt or as interests in insurance policies
and bank deposits which were in turn largely offset by government
debts. Business indebtedness was minimal -- indeed, many of the
great corporations had large net positions in government debts --
as was household indebtedness.
Money-manager capitalism emerged out of this initial post-
World war II position. In part it was the result of the evolution
of financial practices toward more speculative endeavors. But
money-manager capitalism was also partly a consequence of the
emergence of plans that supplemented social security with private
pensions. As the label "money-manager" capitalism suggests,
central to this new stage are institutions that manage large
portfolios of financial instruments.
Economic activity in the early postwar setting began with a
cautious use of debt. But as the period over which the economy did
well began to lengthen, margins of safety in indebtedness decreased
and the system evolved toward a greater reliance on debt relative
to internal finance, as well as toward the use of debt to acquire
existing assets. As a result, the once robust financial system
became increasingly fragile (Minsky 1986).
The first twenty years after World War II were characterized
by financial tranquility. No serious threat of a financial crisis
took place. Since the "credit crunch" of 1966, however, the5
amplitude of the business cycle has increased and financial crises
have become regular occurrences.1 Another Great Depression has
been prevented, but the same actions that stabilize the economy
also validate speculative financial practices. In addition,
instability has been exacerbated by the Federal Reserve's fight
against inflation (Minsky 1986).
In the current era, the largest proportion of the liabilities
of corporations are held either by financial institutions such as
bank trust departments and insurance companies or by pension or
mutual funds that are restricted in their holdings only by
contract. Money-manager capitalism introduces a new layer of
intermediation into the financial structure. The stated aim of
these money-managers -- and the sole criterion by which they are
judged -- is the maximization of the value of the investments made
by the fund holders. This is measured by the total return on
assets: the combination of dividends and interest received and the
appreciation in per share value.
A consequence of the rise of these funds is that business
leaders have become increasingly sensitive to the stock-market
valuation of their firm. In the early postwar period widespread
caution in finance, combined with America's dominance in the global
economy, allowed managers a degree of freedom from stockholder
influence. Today, however, top management is often subject to
relentless shareholder pressure.
When one considers the pressures due to both the rapidly
evolving financial system and the economy's other structural6
changes, it is no surprise that economic insecurity is widespread.
With the passing of the paternalistic financial structure,
corporate paternalism has also faded. Workers at nearly all levels
are insecure, as entire divisions are bought and sold and as
corporate boards exhibit a chronic need to downsize overhead and to
seek out the least expensive set of variable inputs.
Economic Success
In the early postwar period, American policymakers measured
economic success primarily by two aggregate statistics -- the Gross
National Product (the Gross Domestic Product, more recently) and
the unemployment rate. Price stability and greater income equality
were additional objectives, but inflation was not a significant
problem until the late-1960s and a direct assault on inequality
seemed of little necessity since the trend was toward a more
equitable distribution of income. There appeared to be much truth
to the expression "a rising tide lifts all boats."
Reliance upon these particular measures of success was partly
a product of history: the main economic difficulty of the
century's early decades was considered to be capitalism's tendency
to generate severe depressions. These were also measures that
required only a minor reconsideration of standard economics.
Countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies could be easily
reconciled with traditional theory through the "neoclassical
synthesis;" a focus on aggregates made it possible to ignore the
need for an institutional foundation for evolving economic
structures. These gauges of success were also pragmatic. For the7
first two decades of the postwar era -- despite valid concerns
about perennial matters such as how national output ignores
environmental costs and how the unemployment rate ignores
discouraged job seekers (persons counted as not in the labor force)
_ - overall output and employment functioned as useful indicators of
citizen well-being.
Today's economy is different. Many families cannot
distinguish recession from recovery. Despite strong profits and
recent productivity gains, chief economist Stephen Roach of Morgan
Stanley summarizes the view of most Americans when he writes,
"Recovery or not, the 1990s are still all about downsizing, longer
workdays, white-collar shock and relatively limited opportunities
for new employment" (Roach 1995).
Today's widespread insecurity requires economists and
policymakers to look beyond a few aggregate statistics. The
aggregates conceal not just income stagnation and other
difficulties mentioned above but also longer employment searches,
increased family dependence on multiple job holdings, and an
explosive growth in part-time and contingent work. Also concealed
is the anxiety that accompanies the fact that since early 1994
private firms have announced plans to cut more than a half-million
jobs, many in companies (AT&T, for example) that once referred to
their workforce as "family" (Challenger, Gray and Christmas 1996).
Polls released in early 1996 indicate approximately one-third
of America's families fears job loss in the near future (Herbert
1996; Montague 1996). Perhaps even more striking are findings from8
a late-1994 survey conducted for U.S. News and World Report,
findings that indicate Ita major shift" from America's historic
optimism. According to the survey, 57 percent of those asked said
the American Dream is out of reach for most families, while more
than two thirds were worried that their children will not live as
well as they do (Roberts 1994, 32).
In the current era, economic success requires more than
economic growth, low unemployment, and minimal inflation. It
requires that every citizen has the opportunity to develop and
utilize his or her talents and capacities, an economy that rewards
workers with rising standards of living and the prospect of an even
better life for their children. It requires that economic
insecurity be reduced and that prosperity be available to the whole
of society. Without these, American capitalism will not be
successful by any measure for very long in the 21st Century.
Institutional Prerequisites for Successful Capitalism
Economies evolve, and so too must economic policy. The
institutional innovations of the New Deal were valuable in their
time but have become insufficient in the present. The task before
today's economists and policymakers is to meet the challenges of
the coming millennium without forgetting the valuable lessons of
the past, lessons that include: 1) capitalism comes in many
varieties; 2) the institutions established through public policy
play a vital role in determining what form capitalism takes; and  3)
laissez-faire is a prescription for economic disaster.9
It is easy to envision two alternate futures for American
capitalism. The pessimistic future involves a hostile and
uncivilized 81fortress11 capitalism; the optimistic future is an open
and humane t@shared-prosperitylV  capitalism. Fortress capitalism --
a system with declining fortunes for all but a few who must seek
protection behind walled and gated communities -- is the result of
a return to laissez-faire.2 Institutional prerequisites for a
successful, shared-prosperity capitalism are outlined below. A
conceptual starting point is provided by a brief discussion of the
relationship between economic security and progress.
I. Security and Progress
Capitalism can be successful only if economists and
policymakers recognize that people have a limited tolerance for
uncertainty and insecurity. Evidence of this limited tolerance is
provided by insurance, which is purchased to provide protection
against large contingent losses. When deleterious consequences
mount for uncertainty outside the reach of private insurance,
society must respond through public action.
Many have long maintained that the reduction of economic
insecurity is inconsistent with economic progress under capitalism.
But as John Kenneth Galbraith observed decades ago, insecurity is
cherished "almost exclusively in the second person or in the
abstract" (Galbraith 1958, 98). Reducing economic uncertainty has
been a central objective of corporations, labor unions, and
associations of farmers since their inception.10
Economic progress may be threatened by private or collective
efforts to reduce insecurity. The central lesson of the era of
paternalistic capitalism, however, is that security and progress
can also be mutually reinforcing. Indeed, when one takes off the
blinders of conventional economics it becomes clear that
countercyclical stabilization policy was only one element in the
strengthening of capitalism by reducing insecurity.
New Deal agricultural programs, by setting minimum prices and
by providing crop insurance, had the effect of setting floors to
farmers' incomes. These stabilized incomes made it possible for
farmers to finance investment in new technology. Furthermore,
agricultural extension services and experiment stations served to
socialize research costs and disseminate information on scientific
breakthroughs. What followed was a period of unparalleled advance
and productivity growth in agriculture.
Conventional economists often worry that security will reduce
economic lVefficiency.l' But the experience of U.S. agriculture
demonstrates that security can ignite an advantageous dynamic --
one that permanently improves the technological conditions which
determine the very meaning of "efficient."
Moreover, as Henry Simons suggested long ago, economic
efficiency -- even when considered from a dynamic perspective --
should not be the sole aim of economic policy. Rather, policy
should strive to assure the civilized standards of an open and
democratic society. A humane society should not be sacrificed on
the altar of narrow economic efficiency (Simons 1948).11
II. Employment
The Employment Act of 1946 committed the federal government to
promote maximum employment, production and purchasing power. The
Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 reiterated these
objectives and put greater emphasis on employment by identifying a
particular goal, four percent, for the overall unemployment rate.
Today it is necessary to go beyond a statement of objectives and
goals. It is time to fulfill President Franklin Roosevelt's call
for employment to be not merely a responsibility of the able-bodied
but also as a right, one guaranteed
last resort.
by a public-sector employer of
The economic and human costs of unemployment -- to individuals
and to the nation -- are too great to be tolerated in a society
replete with unmet needs. Using the Depression era's Works
Progress Administration (WPA), National Youth Administration (NYA),
and Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) as prototypes, federal, state
and local officials could easily design programs that would enable
unemployed citizens to support themselves by making useful
contributions to their communities.
III. Economic and Social Progress
In the short run, societies can choose between two routes to
competitiveness: a lthigh-performancel'  path and a lllow-wage'V path.
The former involves encouraging firms to compete on the basis of
innovation, product quality, and the development of new markets.
In the United States a policy vacuum has caused most firms to
follow the low-wage path -- a strategy that ultimately leads to an12
economic disaster as firms engage in a "race to the bottom."




policies and institutions must support a virtuous
to economic and social progress (Marshall 1995;
Pursuit of a high-performance path requires incentives for
private investment, but it also requires public investment in
education and training, science and technology, and infrastructure.
Taxes and subsidies should be used to encourage individuals and
firms to enhance productivity through training and the upgrading of
skills. In addition, we must develop national business-assistance
networks modeled after our agricultural extension service. Public
investment, a crucial complement to private investment, must be
revitalized as well.
The U.S. budget is not structured to engender rational
investment decisions. Although there have been periods during
which Washington officials committed themselves to improving public
capital, federal non-defense investments as both a share
outlays and as a share of GDP peaked in the mid-1960s.
nation has the lowest ratio of public-capital investment






Investments in education can be improved not merely by more
money (to upgrade facilities, provide supplies, and reduce class
sizes, for example) but also by closer collaboration both across
levels of government and among business, government and the13
educational community. Vouchers redeemable at private schools are
not what's needed; rather, we must have high educational-
performance standards, national certificates of mastery, and
improvements in apprenticeship programs and other organizations and
services that facilitate the transition from school to work
(Marshall and Tucker 1992; Marshall 1996).
Science and technology policies and institutions are also
required. A role for government has always existed here due to the
social benefits, large-scale risks, and long time horizons
associated with research and development. But today this role is
more important than ever due to the rise of "brain-power"
industries -- industries such as microelectronics and biotechnology
that can be located wherever the necessary talents are coordinated.
As in Europe, consortiums for particular projects should be
established not by government alone but through public-private
partnerships that require matching funds from participating firms
(Thurow 1996).
According to Wallace Peterson, America's neglect of public
infrastructure has left us with more than a trillion dollars in
necessary construction, repairs and renovations (Peterson 1994,
200-201). A study just released by the Manhattan-based Regional
Plan Association indicates that the New York metropolitan region
alone requires $75 billion in transportation and other improvements
over 25 years to save it from outright decline (Johnson 1996).
Institutions and policies that renew the nation's commitment to
infrastructure investment cannot be avoided if America is to14
prosper in the 21st Century. .
Perhaps the most significant obstacle to greater public
investment is an approach to budgeting that treats biotechnology
research no differently than a White House dinner party. To enable
policymakers and the public to make sound judgments on budget
matters, America needs more useful accounting techniques. A full
balance-sheet approach -- listing, as do private organizations,
both assets and liabilities -- is worth exploring. At the very
least, federal officials should follow the lead of the states and
establish a capital budget for tangible investments in public
facilities and in civilian systems such as communications and
transportation.
IV. The Good Financial Society
An essential prerequisite for establishment of a "good
financial society" (the term was used first by Henry Simons) in the
early 21st Century is a Federal Reserve that continues to prevent
debt deflations through its lender-of-last-resort powers. In
addition, the Federal Reserve needs to focus more attention on
qualitative credit controls (i.e., refusing to guarantee or
prohibiting purchase of certain types of assets, particularly those
likely to experience speculative price swings) than on quantitative
controls. Levels of central bank supervision and regulatory
requirements should vary according to the types of assets
purchased.' These steps provide an opportunity not only to reduce
the riskiness of bank lending but also to encourage credit to be
directed toward socially-desirable activities (Wray 1996).15
During the 1992 election campaign Bill Clinton advocated a
national network of Community Development Banks, designed to meet
the needs of communities and citizens not well served by existing
banks. The idea takes on increasing import because of the
heightened uncertainty associated with money-manager capitalism.
The attractiveness of investment in small businesses increases with
the uncertainty attached to jobs in firms whose future is dependent
on the vagaries of money-manager evaluations. Community
development banks should evolve into full-service community
financial institutions (Minsky et al. 1993; Papadimitriou et al.
1993; Minsky 1993).
The sole focus on inflation by the Federal Reserve is
misguided. Contemporary wage-setting patterns and institutional
structures have
has not brought
created an environment in which low unemployment
on the threat of high inflation (London 1995;
Rissman 1988; Bennett 1995). Moreover, the consumer price index is
a flawed tool for those seeking to control inflation (Papadimitriou
and Wray 1996). Shared-prosperity capitalism requires that the
current monetary-policy goal of "zero inflation" be replaced by a
return to the early postwar policy of low and stable interest rates
(Papadimitriou and Wray 1994).
Finally, the good financial society also requires
institutional adjustment in the sphere of international finance.
The current flexible exchange-rate system discourages forward
contracts, encourages speculation, and exerts a stagnationist
influence on the world economy (as nations impose austerity16
measures to deal with trade imbalances). Essential features of a
more secure and prosperous international-finance system include:
stable exchange rates; an accommodative mono-reserve setup; and an
international lender of last resort. A starting point for the
development of this type of world-wide financial structure can be
found in the writings of John Maynard Keynes (Keynes 1980; Davidson
1992; Wray 1996).
V. Shared Prosperity
While the arrangements identified so far provide a foundation
for an affluent future, ensuring shared prosperity requires
additional institutional elements. These include an enhanced
minimum wage; stronger trade unions and employee associations; an
expanded Earned Income Tax Credit; portable pensions; and a health-
care system that provides basic care to all Americans. Also needed
are tax incentives and other inducements that lead firms to: share
productivity and profitability gains with their workers; offer
family-friendly employment benefits and work arrangements; and
foster employee participation from the workplace to the boardroom.
Private money incomes -- such as wages, salaries, dividends,
interest, and transfer payments -- are not the sole source of
personal and family income. Some of our "income" is independent of
these private sources and is the result of publicly-provided goods
and services. It is ambience income -- public consumption. Just
as both rich and poor were once free to sleep under the bridges of
Paris, today's rich and poor are equally free to senjoy" safe
streets. Public investments that promote economic growth andenhance the efficiency of privately-owned capital are certainly
important, but improvements in public consumption -- in urban parks
17
and other public spaces, and in public health and safety, for
example -- are also essential in a civilized society. Moreover,
such endeavors can easily be made compatible with the full-
employment objective discussed earlier.
Finally, the public sector needs a tax system adequate to
support its various operational, employment, resource-creation,
consumption, and debt-validation needs. The explosion of federal
debt relative to GDP during the Reagan-Bush era was due largely to
an irresponsible fiscal policy that undermined the revenue system
while increasing defense spending and failing to control rising
transfer costs, particularly in health care. As America prepares
for the 21st Century, tax and spending policies should be used to
reduce the ratio of federal debt to GDP from its current level of
70 percent to approximately 50 percent. While there are a wide
range of revenue alternatives -- including income, consumption,
inheritance, wealth, and value-added taxes -- some element of
progressivity is warranted due to the increased income inequality
produced by today's capitalism.4
Conclusion
Capitalism was a failed economic order in the winter of 1933.
The Employment Act symbolizes a change in national outlook, one
that produced an institutional structure for successful capitalism
in the wake of the 1929-1933 disaster. Perhaps the first two
decades following enactment of that legislation were not a "Golden18
Age" but they stand as a historical and practical best.
Capitalism evolves and so too must the legislated
institutional structure. The evolution of the private sector's
institutional structure is market driven -- driven by agents acting
in their own self interest. This evolution can undermine the
barriers to instability and dynamic inefficiency. Such undermining
has to be offset from time to time by changes in the government's
institutional structure. These dynamic institutional changes
preserve the dynamic efficiency of capitalism.
The institutional structure of paternalistic capitalism
reduced economic insecurity and enhanced the performance of the
economy so that a failed economic system was transformed into a
successful order. Similarly apt institutional changes are needed
to transform the insecurity-breeding money-manager capitalism into
a new structure conducive to successful capitalism.
The fiftieth anniversary of the Employment Act should be
celebrated by looking back and congratulating ourselves for many
accomplishments. But we should also commemorate the occasion by
looking ahead -- toward a new era of institution building.
Economic systems are not natural SyStemS. It is possible not only
to reduce present-day economic insecurity without sacrificing
economic progress but also to frame and establish the institutional
prerequisites for a successful 21st Century capitalism. The goals
of the Employment Act are best honored by working to achieve a new
age of shared prosperity.19
Notes
1. At the center of the 1966 "credit crunch" was a rrrunlV on bank-
negotiable certificates of deposit (Wolfson 1994, 31-39).
2. For more on fortress capitalism, see Thurow (1995).
3. The need to vary bank supervision according to the types of
assets purchased is especially true in the case of institutions
deemed "too big to fail." As L. Randall Wray suggested recently,
such an institution "should be subject to increasingly close
supervision as it engages in activities thought to be risky" (Wray
1996, 143).
4. For one approach to the revenue system, see Minsky (1996).
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